This paper examines whether the export decision of firms is affected by their ownership structure, specifically it looks at whether family control is an obstacle to entering foreign markets. The underlying assumption is that family firms are risk averse. Risk aversion may be an obstacle to entering foreign markets, as far as these are perceived as more volatile and risky than the domestic one, particularly when such choice entices bearing relatively high sunk costs. We develop an illustrative theoretical model that shows how the combination between high risk aversion and low initial productivity may hinder family firms' decision to enter foreign markets, particularly distant ones. The empirical analysis, based on a detailed panel data set of Italian firms covering the years from 1995 to 2003, confirms such predictions by showing that family controlled firms do indeed export less than other type of companies even after controlling for firm heterogeneity in productivity, size, technology and access to credit. JEL Classifications: F1, F14, L2
Introduction
The ability of a firm to operate in a foreign market is largely a function of its own characteristics, namely its technology, the skill mix of its personnel, as well as its ownership, governance and organizational structure. When new opportunities open up abroad, the firm will respond by adjusting some of the factors that impinge on its competitiveness in foreign markets. Other factors, including its ownership structure, will be harder to change, particularly in the short run. This paper takes a close look at the case of family firms. The key question we seek to address is whether these companies face different sets of incentives, compared say to widely owned firms, when entering a foreign market as exporters.
Family firms are widespread across Europe as well as in the US. In Italy family control is the dominant form of ownership in the corporate sector, with no substantial changes in this feature in the last couple of decades (Giacomelli and Trento, 2005) . In France two thirds of listed firms are controlled either by the founder or his heirs (Sraer and Thesmar, 2006) . Families control 45% of voting blocks of listed companies in Austria and 32% in Germany (Becht and Mayer, 2001 ). In the US large listed corporations like Wal-Mart or Ford are family controlled (Perez-Gonzalez, 2006 ).
The link between family firms and export has not been explored yet. On the one hand, many papers have analysed theoretically and empirically how family ownership affects performance in general (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2003 , Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003 , Perez-Gonzalez, 2006 , Sraer and Thesmar, 2006 , Favero et al 2007 , Bertrand and Schoar, 2006 , but none whether it also influences the decision to enter export markets and internationalise activities. On the other hand, several papers by Marin and Verdier (2006 and relate export performance to the degree of decentralisation of the governance of the firm, but they do not deal directly with the ownership structure.
Why, then, is it important to analyse how the structure of ownership of firms affects their performance in the international market? In this paper we focus on risk aversion. The shareholder's objective in widely held firms is the maximization of expected profits. Shareholders are assumed to be able to diversify their portfolio in different (and uncorrelated) activities and, as a result, only require managers to maximize the expected value of profits. Accordingly, managers behave as if shareholders were risk neutral. Shareholders of family firms, instead, generally have a large share of their wealth concentrated in the company. With incomplete insurance markets, their ability to diversify risk is limited. They will therefore try to reduce the exposure to risk of the firm they own. Formally, they or their managers will maximize the expected utility of the firm's profits rather than the expected value of such profits.
The attitude to risk has a substantial bearing on the export and FDI decision of firms. In what follows we focus on exports. Though it might be a way of edging local demand shocks, entering the export market is a risky choice: it involves sunk costs, potentially higher volatility of revenues, limited knowledge of a new market, tougher competition etc. Thus, whereas in widely held companies decision of entry is essentially related to expected cost and revenue factors, in family firms it is also affected by the level of risk aversion of the shareholders.
Family firms differ of course from public corporations under many other aspects that might also influence the export decision. It is often argued that they are relatively less efficient than other firms , for example because of the dynastic choice of management, and therefore cannot recover the sunk cost of entering the new export market 1 . Also, family firms are typically reluctant to partly decentralise governance in order to manage complex operations spread in several countries. We will also take these other factors into account in our analysis.
We develop a simple illustrative model of the decision of exporting. This choice is governed by the cost of entering new markets, the risk attendant to such decision and the owner's risk aversion. We assume that firms have the option of selling their goods in three different markets: home, a close foreign market (Europe) and a far away market (the rest of the world). Under different configurations on sunk costs and volatility of revenues across markets we show that the export decision is a function of both the sunk costs of exporting and the firm's risk aversion.
The predictions of our model are then tested for a panel of Italian firms. Italy provides an ideal testing ground for our model. The country has been steadily losing competitiveness in world markets 2 and has only recently been able to regain market shares. The specialisation of Italian firms in traditional sectors, their average small size and the wide diffusion of family ownership are often seen as major constraints to strengthening competitiveness and gaining market shares.
1 Although evidence on this is not uncontroversial. For example, Favero et al, 2006 find in a subsample of listed companies that Italian family firms are more productive than the others. 2 The share of Italian products in world trade in constant prices fell from 4.5% in 1995 to 3% in 2003, the years covered by our micro-data.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. We find that, controlling for several firm specific factors, family firms export less than others, both in Europe and in the rest of the World. On average these firms sell about 3 percent more output in the domestic market, 10 percent less in the European market and 12 percent less in non European countries than non family firms. This effect holds, even when we control for those standard factors which per se are supposed to hamper the efficient working of family firms and consequently the choice of exporting, like the structure of management and credit constraints. It also holds when we control for the direct effect of productivity. Although risk aversion cannot be directly observed and measured, it provides a plausible explanation of this gap.
It is however important to notice that we find non linearities in the way productivity and size relate to the export gap. The negative effect of being a family firm on exports is smaller for large and highly efficient firms 3 . In our framework of analysis this means that risk aversion is a greater obstacle to exporting for small and least productive firms, but its effect tends to fade away with size and efficiency. This is a realistic outcome. The "all eggs in one basket" argument certainly bites more when firms are small than for large, often diversified and listed conglomerates, albeit controlled by one family.
In what follows we briefly review the literature on family firms and performance. We then develop our theoretical model. The following section describes the data we use and our empirical specifications. In section 4 we report our empirical findings and finally we conclude and derive the main policy implications.
Family firms and the decision to export: analytical background
Why should the structure of ownership of firms affect their decision to carry out activities in foreign markets and their international performance? There are very few contributions looking at the exporting decision, but from the broader literature we may identify three reasons why family firms might behave differently from other firms: performance, agency problems and risk preferences.
As for performance, the positive association between efficiency and the international activities of the firms, being those exports or foreign direct investment, is a well established fact. Most of the theoretical and empirical literature reconciles this association with the need to overcome the fixed 3 The effect of family firms on exporting becomes non significant at the 90 th percentile of the size distribution and at the the 95 th percentile of the productivity distribution.
cost of entering foreign markets. If family firms are on average less efficient, their ex-ante chances of having international operations are lower than for public companies.
Indeed, several studies have shown that, other things equal, family firms are less efficient than public companies. These findings go far back to the historical evidence on British firms provided by David Landes, (1965) (Bertrand and Schoar, 2007) . The only exception to this consensus is a recent study on France (Sraer and Thesmar, 2006) , that finds that family owned firms, first or further generation, perform better than widely held companies and a study on a sample of 150 Italian listed companies by Favero et al (2006) .
One reason why family firms perform relatively badly is that the dynastic transmission of the management responsibility over the firm reduces the pool of talents among which managers are selected (Caselli and Gennaioli, 2003 , Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003 , Bennedsen et al 2006 .
Family firms may also be constrained by the lack of external funds and the owner's reluctance to open up management to qualified outsiders.
A second line of argument, but leading to opposite conclusions, concerns agency issues. The organizational strength of the family firm is indeed its ability to overcome agency problems in management decisions. Family bonds reduce the incentive to shirk for members of the family.
Therefore, centralised management can in principle be more efficient when firms deal with complex and highly risky markets (Berle and Means, 1932) . From this perspective family firms could in principle be expected to be better fit than other type of firms for the international market, given that these are highly volatile and less known to the firm than the domestic one.
These two arguments are however not fully convincing. As for the first one Marin and Verdier (2006) and Acemoglu et al (2007) argue that what really matters for performance, and consequently the decision to go abroad, is not much the type of ownership of the firm but, rather, the degree of decentralisation of decision making. This conclusion is also supported by evidence on a sample of US firms (Zahara, 2005) . Family firms could likely overcome the problem of dynastic management by hiring professional managers, as it is indeed the case in most large family companies. Therefore, even if on average we might expect family firms to be less productive, there will be a large variance in performance, as these firms move to more sophisticated and decentralised systems of management. Thus, when we relate ownership to export performance we must make sure we also control for the role external managers play within the firm. The same type of reasoning should also apply to the second argument and somehow revert its logic. When firms expand into foreign markets, family members are forced to delegate part of their power to independent managers. In other words, agency problems would emerge anyway, as centralised decision making procedures necessarily get diluted to successfully operate in foreign markets. If this is the case, then, the agency argument backfires. Shareholders could be against expanding into foreign markets, precisely because they do not want to decentralise decision making.
A third line of argument explaining a possible reluctance to expand abroad, the one we follow in this paper, is related to risk aversion. In the presence of incomplete markets for risk diversification, we might expect that decision making in a family firm is characterised by greater risk aversion than in a public company. Indeed, public companies should aim at maximizing expected profits, as shareholders can diversify their risk through their portfolio of assets. Shareholders of family firms are likely to have a large chunk of their wealth in the firm, in other words they are less able to diversify their risk through asset allocation. With imperfect insurance markets, risk adverse shareholders will tend to maximise their expected utility rather than the expected level of profits.
The fact that family firms are often less leveraged than widely held corporation is taken by several contributions as an indirect evidence of the higher risk aversion of their shareholders (Agrawal and Nagarajan, 1990 , Schulze and Dino, 1998 , Zellweger, 2006 , Gallo, Tapies and Cappuyns, 2000 , Mishra and Mc Conaughy, 1999 .
The reasons why risk aversion might discourage entry into foreign markets are three. The first one is that these markets can be more volatile than the domestic one. The counterfactual is of course that by selling their products in several markets firms mange to hedge market specific volatility. Yet, we will show in the next section that the variability of profits per employee is higher for exporting than for non exporting firms in our sample. The second one is that firms have a relatively imperfect knowledge of other countries and their economies. Finally, if exporting involves initial sunk costs, which are relatively large with respect to the size of the firm and financial markets are imperfect, then the risk of bankruptcy might be larger for exporters, other things equal. All these reasons are strengthened the more complex are international activities in terms of export intensity, the number and the distance of the markets served, the range of foreign operations (trade and FDI).
If these assumptions are correct, then risk adverse shareholders of family firms might be reluctant to undertake this step, independently of their ex-ante efficiency and the structure of management within the firm. Risk aversion might induce family firms to avoid entering foreign markets, even if they are highly profitable and they have already a fairly decentralised management structure.
In the next section we take this presumption to the data and show some stylised facts that are in line with the idea that family firms are more reluctant to enter export markets because of risk aversion.
Basic facts and motivations
We need three pieces of information to support our argument. First we must show that the behaviour of family firms is indeed consistent with the hypothesis of risk aversion. Second, we need to check if family firms export less than non family firms. Also, as the decision to export involves several potential markets, we need to see if the export behaviour of these firms is affected by the characteristics of the potential market, for example its remoteness. Third, we must examine if exporting does indeed involve more risk than operating in the domestic market. Before addressing these issues, though we must briefly describe the data set we use.
Data and descriptive statistics
The data used in this paper come from the last three waves (1998, 2001 and 2004) From the detailed information on the firm's structure of labour force and ownership, we define family firms as those where either the founder or one of his family members is part of management.
The only other restriction we impose is that the firm has a share of private ownership greater than
This definition is relatively loose, as firms could be fully run by independent managers. Accordingly, several amongst Italy's largest groups would not be classified as family firms in our
analysis. Yet this definition has two advantages. The first one is that it is probably fully exogenous from the exporting status of the firm. In other words firm that start exporting might need to hire independent managers, or dilute control, but not necessarily to change ownership status and expel or family members from management. The second one, that the presence of family member in management is an indirect, albeit imperfect indicator of the influence of the family over the running of the company. Moreover, notice that our sample combines non-listed and listed firms, which is a step forward with respect to previous empirical studies of family firms, which are based on evidence for listed firms 5 .
Restricting our family firms to those with a non negative share of private ownership, might fail to capture family firms organised as holdings. In our sample there are indeed 574 firms that are managed by the founder and/or the family but have no private ownership. In Appendix A3 we carry out a robustness check and we show that our results hold when we include also this group of firms. Table 1 reports the distribution of firms according to their ownership status and their size. Almost 80 percent of the firms in our sample can be classified as family firms, on the basis of our definition. As expected, the distribution of family ownership by firm size is skewed towards smaller firms. However family firms are not necessarily small. Indeed, more than 26 percent of the firms with more than 500 employees are family owned. Furthermore we show in the appendix that there is not an identifiable sectoral pattern in the distribution of family firms (Table A1 .1). 
Basic facts
Are family firms risk averse? Risk aversion cannot be observed directly, but we can compare the propensity of taking risky decisions of family and other firms. Several contributions have argued that an outcome of risk aversion is a less leveraged financial structure 6 . In table 2 we report a measure of leverage for the two groups of companies. This measure is given by the ratio of financial debts to total assets 7 . Family firms are moderately, on average, less leveraged than other firms. Of course this is a very crude indicator of risk aversion, in that the degree of leverage reflects both the preferences of the firms and of the bankers. Firms could be less leveraged because they have a lower ability to repay, because they are smaller and credit constrained (Guiso, 2004 shows that small Italian firms in Italy have less access to credit than larger ones). In table 2, indeed, we show that on average family firms in our sample are marginally less efficient 8 and smaller than other firms. Also, a larger share among them face credit constraints 9 and a smaller share use alternative sources of funding like risk capital. To control for higher moments of the distribution, we also show in figure 1 the distribution of the two groups of firms on the basis of their productivity. We find non family firms are weakly dominating family ones in terms of productivity distribution 10 .
To understand if family firms are less leveraged, even taking into account the other characteristics that might impinge on their financial structure, we regress the leverage index on a dummy capturing the firm ownership status (family or not) and controls such as size, productivity, industry and time dummies. Furthermore we also include the credit constraint dummy as a control to check if the smaller leverage is entirely explained by the access to credit. Columns (3) and (6) show that this is not the case. There is of course strong endogneity in all of these relationship; these regressions should be taken as purely descriptive. The results, reported in appendix A1, confirm that the lower leverage of family firms is robust to the inclusion of such controls. . 
Notes:
The difference in the means is statistically different from zero at 1% confidence level for all the variables a TFP index where productivity is normalized with respect to sector, year and class size averages. According to our data, family firms do export a lower share of their sales than non family ones, 25,3% vs. 33,1%. In table 3 we look at market destinations. We report, for each group of firms, the share of those that only sell at home, only export to the EU, only to the Rest of the World and to both markets. We find that among family firms the share either not exporting or exporting just to one area (EU or RoW) is larger. In contrast the share of firms selling to both export areas is considerably lower. Of course this is again purely descriptive at this stage. We will show in section 6 how these results hold when tested under rigororus econometric analysis. We therefore regress this index on several measures of the exporting activity of the firm and controls like size, industry and time dummies. We find that exports are positively related to the volatility of profits and that selling in different markets does not seem to be a risk hedging strategy.
In column 1 of table 4 we compare exporting and non exporting firms, whereby EXP is a dummy which is equal 1 if firms do export. We find that profits are more volatile for firms that export. Yet, being an exporter in itself does not mean much. Here we classify as exporters also firms that do sell abroad 1% of their output. What matters for volatility is how important exports are with respect to the total activities of the firm. In column 2 we therefore look at the share of exports on total sales, and find that volatility keeps increasing with export intensity.
It is also important to consider the destination of exports. Far away markets could be riskier than closer ones: firms might have a more limited knowledge of such countries. But these markets could also provide better risk hedging, as trends in demand are less likely to be correlated to those at home. In our sample we can observe whether firms export to the EU or to the rest of the world (RoW). In column 3 we relate the volatility index to a dummy that captures four potential statuses of the firm: if it does not exports, our excluded dummy, if it exports to the EU, to the RoW or to both areas. We find that volatility is significantly higher for firms exporting to both areas. It is also higher (although not significantly) for firms exporting in either areas, but less so for exporters to the Rest of the World. We can therefore conclude that a diversified exporting strategy is indeed associated to higher risks. Firms operating in several markets are exposed to more uncertain outcomes, probably because they have a limited knowledge of individual countries, or because the likelihood of facing downward trends in local markets increases. Risks rise also when firms operate just in one export area, although "RoW" provides some better hedging than the nearby EU market.
11 More precisely this measure is given by the standard deviation between t and (t-3) of the profits per employee Notes: σ (π/empl) has been calculated between t and (t-3) All estimations include two-digit industry dummies, size controls and time dummies. a the sample has been restricted to those firms that we can follow for more than one wave and we can see changing their export status Robust standard errors in brackets. *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Summing up exporting does indeed appear to be associated with higher volatility. It also seems that risks rise with the intensity and geographic diversification of foreign activities.
The stylised facts reported in this section are helpful in defining a set of working hypothesis for the construction of a simple theoretical model of the decision to export for risk adverse firms.
The model
Consider a simple model where a firm can either sell in its own domestic market (D) only or export to possibly two foreign markets (EU and ROW) as well.
If the firm caters only to the domestic market, its net revenue is:
where ε is N(0,1) . If the firm also sells to a foreign market, its additional revenue is:
where i= EU, ROW, η i is N(0,1), σ i > 1, and f i is the fixed cost of exporting to country i. We assume that both η eu and η row are correlated with ε, with correlation coefficients ρ eu and ρ row respectively 12 . Note that y D and y i -f i are independently determined. The implicit (and strong) assumption in this set up is that either constant returns to scale prevail both at home and abroad (except for the fixed cost component) or that markets are segmented, so that the non stochastic component of revenues (y D and y i -f i ) are uncorrelated.
Finally, we assume that that firms' owners are not able to fully diversify their assets. Accordingly, they will maximize the expected value of the utility of the firm's profits rather than, as in the standard set up with complete diversification, the expected value of profits. For tractability, we assume that the owner's utility is of the CARA type. The optimization problem becomes:
where the second equality derives from the assumption that the error term is normally distributed.
Risk aversion is measured by parameter a.
We need to determine the value of R. If the firm sells only in the domestic market, then R=R D , with mean y D and variance equal to one. If in addition the firm sells also to market i, then total revenue is distributed normally with mean y D + y i and variance 1 + σ 2 i + 2 σ i ρ i . Accordingly, the firms will export to market i if the following condition holds:
We first consider the case where f eu < f row and (σ eu 2 /2) + σ eu ρ eu ≤ (σ row 2 /2) + σ row ρ row , namely when the EU market is less costly and less risky than the rest of the world.
The possible equilibria can be represented by a simple graph:
Figure 2: Equilibria
where EU (ROW) = 0 indicates that there is no export activity to the EU (ROW). Consider the area where the firm exports to both markets. Suppose that risk aversion, i.e. the parameter a, increases.
We then move from left to right. We see that for a critical threshold of the risk aversion parameter, the firm will stop exporting to ROW (the riskier market) and for an even higher level of a, will stop exporting altogether.
We can also assess the impact of higher productivity. Suppose that initially the firm does not export to either markets (i.e. EU=ROW=0). If now y i increases, the firm will first start exporting to the EU and then when y i is high enough will also export to the rest of the world. More crucially, we see that the impact of higher productivity on the export decision will depend on the level of risk aversion.
With higher risk aversions, even relatively productive firm will not export. 
Figure 3: Equilibria (market diversification)
Most of the previous analysis carries through. The interesting twist here is that firms may not need to export to the EU before exporting to the rest of the world. Relatively risk averse firms may prefer exporting to far away markets first simply as a way to diversify their risk.
Empirical Implementation
In addition to the descriptive evidence shown in section 2, tables A. are exporters. Moreover, exporting firms typically sell both in the EU and in the Rest of the World.
The share of firms exporting only to the EU is relatively small, 15,6%; that of firms exporting only to the Rest of the World is even smaller (4.9%). Interestingly enough, the domestic market is a key outlet, even for exporting firms.
A clear and expected pattern is that firms exporting in both markets are the largest and the most productive. Also, the role of independent managers and the skill intensity of the personnel seem to be increasing with the complexity of international activities.
Of course not much can be said from these purely descriptive patterns and we now move on to the econometric analysis.
Empirical Specifications
Our empirical strategy is understanding the relationship between the ownership status of the firm and its export performance. Remember that our presumption is that family firms are more reluctant to export, particularly to distant markets because of risk aversion. This can only be tested indirectly, as risk aversion cannot be measured. We will therefore estimate the link between ownership status and export, controlling for all the other observable factors that might also affect this relationship (productivity, management, credit constraints etc.).
The empirical specification is inspired by the model developed in section 4. We use a probabilistic framework to model the decision to export to a specific destination. A firm decides to sell its product abroad when the current value of expected utility from profits from exporting exceeds the fixed costs associated with international trade.
This can be expressed with a discrete-choice equation:
where Y itj is the variable indicating sales of firm i at time t in market j (EU, Rest of the World,
is a function of expected profits and the attitude towards risks at the firm level and ij S are fixed costs for firm i of exporting to j. We then assume that expected profits are a function of firm characteristics X it while the attitude toward risk depends on the firm's ownership structure. After adding an error term, the choice equation becomes:
According to the literature on the determinants of firms' export decision (Bernard and Jensen, 2004) , the vector X it of firm's characteristics includes employment, productivity, the age of the firm and technological proxies as skill intensity and R&D. R it includes characteristics such as ownership structure that can capture risk aversion. D j are destination dummies. ρ i are time invariant firm's characteristics such as industry 13 and δ t is a time effect.
Taking as dependent variable the value of sales to each destination we estimate Poisson regressions.
We rely on a constant elasticity framework, where the conditional expectation of Y itj can be expressed as E(exp(x it β)). We can then derive the following equation to be estimated via Poisson pseudo maximum likelihood estimator
The Poisson estimator is adequate to take into account the zero-values of the dependent variable. In addition it has the desirable robustness property that consistency of estimates will be achieved as long as the conditional mean is correctly specified without requiring any additional assumptions on the distribution of Y itj given X it (Wooldridge, 2002 and Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) . Therefore the data do not have to follow a Poisson distribution neither Y itj needs to be an integer for the estimations to be consistent (Gourieroux, Monfort and Trognong, 1984) . Standard errors will be affected by deviations from the Poisson assumption: to cope with this issue we compute variance-covariance matrices robust to overdispersion and heteroskedasticity.
The framework presented in section 4 is focused on the discrete choice of exporting to a specific destination. Therefore, to distinguish between the choice of exporting and the quantities exported we also check for selection into export with an Heckman selection model.
Results
The first column of Table 5 shows the estimates of our benchmark equation on the value of sales by destination; where we do not include any proxy for risk aversion, i.e. vector R it . As expected, we find that firms tend to sell, on average, a larger values at home than abroad, as indicated by the negative sign of both the EU 14 dummy and the Rest of the World dummy that represent the destination fixed effects 15 . Productivity is a key factor affecting the decision concerning the market of destination of output. A measure of total factor productivity is included in the estimations, by itself and interacted with the EU and the ROW dummies. We find that more productive firms tend to sell relatively more in the EU than at home and shipping an even greater share of their output to far away destinations in the Rest of the World. In all the estimates we control also for size and firm characteristics such as age, skill share, employment in R&D and share of foreign ownership.
Different specifications of this benchmark equation are reported in appendix A1.
In column 2, we expand the benchmark equation to assess the impact of corporate ownership to see whether family firms behave differently. We therefore add to the baseline specification a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for family firms (and zero otherwise) and interact it with the destination dummies. Note that our indicator of family firms is likely exogenous to the choice of the output market. We find that family firms, even after controlling for productivity and size 16 tend to sell more in the domestic market, export less to the EU and even less to the Rest of the World 17 . In other words, and this is our key results, the ownership status has a significant effect on the decision to export and specifically family firms are less likely to enter foreign markets, even less so for distant ones. Note that this effect holds independently on the standard effects of size and productivity on the exporting decision. In other words even though family firms might be less productive than non family ones, this and size are not sufficient motives to justify their relatively weaker export performance.
We also control for the interacted effect of the ownership status and productivity. Do our findings on the effect of ownership on the export decision change according to the level of productivity of the firm? We find that the negative family effect tends to be weaker the higher is productivity. The same result holds if we interact ownership status and size (Column 5). This tells us that the ownership constraint to exporting is partly overcome in more productive and larger firms.
14 EU is considered in its EU15 meaning and it includes: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Portugal, UK, Spain, Sweden 15 Where the base category is the home market 16 In columns 1 3 and 4 we also include size dummies but we do not report the coefficients. 17 According to the Pseudo R 2 , by adding this variable we also improve the fit of the model. 
Notes:
Coefficients for the regressors as estimated by Poisson maximum likelihood estimator; All estimations include controls (not reported) for Age of the firm, workers' skill ratio, employment in R&D, Share of foreign ownership (also interacted with destination dummies) in addition to size dummies (except for columns 2 and 5) two-digit industry dummies and time dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, The Poisson estimates in Table 5 do control for "zeros" but do not properly differentiate between domestic and foreign markets. Therefore, to account for the selection into export market we also estimate an Heckman selection model with maximum likelihood and we report the results in table 6.
To identify the selection equation we use the credit constraint dummy since we consider this as proxy of the fixed costs incurred by firms in entering markets. We exclude this variable from the second step given that once the fixed costs are paid firms decide on their sales on the basis of other characteristics. We choose to control only for selection in export markets and not selection into each market (column 1b and 2b ) since we want to exclude the domestic sales. Column 1a confirms the results of our benchmark equation and column 2a the results on the family variable. j=EU, RoW, Home; All estimations include controls (not reported) for Age of the firm, workers' skill ratio, employment in R&D, Share of foreign ownership (also interacted with destination dummies) in addition to size dummies, two-digit industry dummies and time dummies; Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
To conclude, as a robustness check, in Table 7 , we show how these results are robust to controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity using a fixed effect Poisson estimator 18 . These estimates should be seen with considerable caution. In a fixed effect framework, the coefficients are identified through firm level within variation. However, the structure of our panel means that larger firms are more likely to appear in two consecutive waves. Hence, in this latter case, our coefficients are more likely to capture the behaviour of large firms rather than small and medium sized ones.
18 Poisson allows estimation of results with firm fixed effects since (unlike Heckman selection model) it is not susceptible to incidental parameter problems (Wooldridge, 2002) . Robust standard errors are obtained using the "xtpqml" stata module that implements the correction described in Wooldridge (1999). 
All estimations include controls (not reported) for Age of the firm, workers' skill ratio, employment in R&D, Share of foreign ownership (also interacted with destination dummies) in addition to size dummies two-digit industry dummies and time dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Finally in Appendix 1 (Table A1 .5) we report further robustness checks. We include in these regressions other observable factors that might affect the propensity of family firms to exports and that might therefore be captured by the family dummy in the estimations reported above. These are whether firms are listed (and indirect sign of access to capital and sophistication of the financial structure), credit constraint and the presence of independent managers.
We are aware that particularly the share of independent managers suffers from severe endogeneity problems. Still, it is necessary to check whether our results survive to the addition of such covariate.
Findings are reassuring. The base results on the impact of the family dummy, size and productivity are all unchanged. Second, as expected, we find that firms with a higher share of outside managers tend to export more, particularly to far away destinations, though the direction of causality for this variable remains ambiguous.
Summing up, even controlling for all those factors that might explain why family firms are less export oriented, our regressions preserve a significant effect of the family dummy. This tells us that family firms are less export oriented than other firms for other reasons than efficiency, size, the presence of independent managers or credit constraints. Even though we cannot capture it directly, we attribute this remaining unobserved effect to risk aversion.
Conclusions
This paper examines whether the export decision of firms is somehow affected by their ownership structure. The key argument is that family firms are likely to be more risk averse than widely owned firms. This is an all eggs in one basket argument: in the case of family firms most assets of the owners will likely be concentrated in the firm. In contrast, shareholders of widely held firms can diversify their assets through the market. Consequently, in the absence of complete insurance markets, the objective of family firms is to maximize the expected utility of their risk averse shareholders, and the objective of widely held firms is the maximisation of the profits of their (behaving like) risk neutral shareholders.
Risk aversion may be an obstacle to enter foreign markets, as far as these are perceived as more volatile and risky than the domestic one, particularly when such choice entices bearing relatively high sunk costs.
We develop an illustrative theoretical model that shows how the combination between high risk aversion and low initial productivity may hinder family firms' decision to enter foreign markets, particularly distant ones. We test this hypothesis for a sample of Italian companies. The problem is of great concern in Italy, where a large share of the firms are family owned. We do find that family ownership does indeed affect export choices in the expected way independently of productivity and other firm characteristics that influence export behaviour. We attribute this effect to risk aversion.
Therefore we show that family management leads to a specific distribution of sales across markets:
only because managed by the owners, these firms sell on average about 3 percent more output in the domestic market, 10 percent less in the close by European market and 12 percent less in the more far away destinations 19 than predicted by their characteristics such size, productivity and labour composition. This family bias is however smaller for larger and highly productive firms. If a family firm has a total factor productivity above the 90 th percentile of the distribution then the negative effect in the European market is totally compensated while if a firm has a productivity above the 95 th percentile then also the bias on the more far away markets disappears 20 .
Appendix A1 
Notes:
Columns (1) to (4) report the coefficients for the regressors as estimated by Poisson maximum likelihood estimator; All estimations include two-digit industry dummies and time dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; The sample is selected with a stratified design on location, industrial activity and size for all firms with less than 500 employees. While all firms with more than 500 employees are included in each wave.
We removed from the sample firms with inconsistencies or missing values on all the variables of interests. In addition, the first and the last percentiles have been used as lower and upper thresholds for the trimming procedure to exclude the extreme values.
The following table describes the structure of the unbalanced panel of 7363 firms that is been used in the estimations. Sheet 2003 Sheet -1992 Sheet 2003 Sheet -1992 Sheet 2003 Sheet -1992 Sheet 2000 Sheet -1992 Sheet 2000 Sheet -1992 Sheet 1998 Sheet -1992 Sheet 2003 Sheet -1992 Appendix A3: Family firm definition Inspecting those 547 firms that are managed by the founder and/or the family but have no private ownership we find that 198 firms are for more than 95% owned by service (or public) firms, 188 firms are for more than 95% owned by banks or financial institutions and 187 firms are for more than 95% owned by foreign firms/individuals. Looking at the distribution by size there is not a clear pattern being those excluded firms evenly distributed across size classes. Table A3 .2 shows some of the main regressions where the family dummy includes also those 574 firms and the results are substantially unchanged. 
Coefficients for the regressors as estimated by Poisson maximum likelihood estimator; All estimations include controls (not reported) for Age of the firm, workers' skill ratio, employment in R&D, Share of foreign ownership (also interacted with destination dummies) in addition to size dummies (except for columns 6 and 7) two-digit industry dummies and time dummies. Robust standard errors in brackets * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%,
